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A SURVEY OF THE LEGAL, ETHICAL, AND PUBLIC
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS OF IN VITRO
FERTILIZATION
M. KAREN MCCARTAN*
Modern technology enables physicians to fertilize human
ova in vitro and to transfer human embryos to the wombs of
mothers. The practice of in vitro fertilization (IVF) provides a
striking and dramatic example of a region where scientific,
ethical and legal issues intersect and where the need for the
guidance of the law is particularly urgent. A rapidly advanc-
ing technological civilization challenges a legal system which
historically has responded to existing problems and seldom
has anticipated them. While the law has demonstrated its ca-
pacity to meet new problems, the nature of the new repro-
ductive technology demands an active rather than a reactive
policy approach, for the failure of the law to keep pace with
scientific development and to challenge some of the basic as-
sumptions of a technological society could affect the future of
humans as a species.
The role of the law in guiding scientific development has
not been clearly established, and in fact regulation of scien-
tific advancement has not been welcomed by those active in
progressive areas of medical research. Still, according to
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, the law does govern the ad-
vancements of medical science. Upon reviewing an article
which characterized law and medicine as two restless horses
drawing the chariot of medical science but often pulling in
conflicting directions, Burger claimed that "[t]he thrust of
this analogy is sound, but I challenge the cast of characters. I
would frame the analogy with one horse as the practicing
physician, the other horse as the medical investigator while
the chariot carries the human race. And whether one likes it
or not, the law is the driver."1 Burger would refuse to allow
law to "steer" medical research but it has the duty to keep it
within the "speed limits" of society.
* A.B. 1983, Princeton University; J.D. 1986, University of Notre
Dame; Thos. J. White Scholar, 1984-86.
1. Burger, Reflections on Law and Experimental Medicine, 15 UCLA L.
REv. 436, 440 (1968). Burger wrote this article while serving as Judge of
the U.S. Court of Appeals of the D.C. Circuit.
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I. THE STATE OF THE IVF ART
A. Human Reproduction and the IVF Procedure
For some in our society, fertility is not a condition taken
for granted and the human reproductive system, in these un-
fortunate cases, is completely "inefficient." IVF offers help to
the infertile, but the medical procedure is only partially effi-
cient.2 Still, many seeking the treatment are encouraged by
the fact that since the birth of Louise Brown on July 25,
1978, more than 700 pregnancies have resulted from IVF
and the subsequent transfer of the embryo to the womb of
the mother.3
In order to fertilize human ova in the laboratory, the
medical doctor must first harvest ova from the female. Since
human females normally produce only one mature ovum per
menstrual cycle, doctors often employ the technique of
superovulation, that is, the administration of a hormone
which induces the production of a larger than usual number
of ova. The ova are secured from the female by means of a
surgical procedure called laparascopy in which a needle is in-
serted into the patient's abdomen under general anesthesia.
The laparascope allows visual sighting of follicles containing
mature ova, and the ova are removed from the follicles by
means of the needle. The timing of the operation is crucial
because an egg will not develop properly if it is collected too
early. If attempts at collection are too late, the ovary may al-
2. Dr. R.G. Edwards and Dr. P.C. Steptoe report that at Bourn Hall,
Cambridge, embryos fertilized in vitro were replaced in the uteri of 1200
women. The "clinical" pregnancy rate rose from 16.5% from October,
1980, to almost 30% in 1983. See Edwards & Steptoe, Current Status of In-
Vitro Fertilisation and Implantation of Human Embryos, 2 LANCET, 1265
(1983).
While the IVF procedure is not "totally efficient," neither is the process
of natural human reproduction. That is, not every meeting of sperm and
ovum results in the production of a viable embryo. One study estimates
that in 16% of cases where human ova are exposed to sperm, fertilization
fails to occur. When fertilization does occur, the rate of embryonic loss
during the first week is estimated to be 18% and in the second week an
additional 32%. According to this study, only 37% of human zygotes sur-
vive to be delivered subsequently as live infants. See ETHICS ADVISORY
BOARD, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, REPORT AND CONCLU-
SIONS: HEW SUPPORT OF RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN IN VITRO FERTILIZA-
TION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER, 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Ethics Advisory
Board Report].
3. Hogden, Statement Before the Subcommittee on Investigations
and Oversight of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House
of Representatives, August 9, 1984.
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ready have released the egg, and the egg is then lost.
Following the successful harvesting of ova, technicians
unite the ova with the sperm of a male in a laboratory me-
dium and incubator to allow fertilization. The egg is studied
at intervals to ensure that cell division is in progress. If the
embryo has developed satisfactorily, the doctor will transfer
it to the uterus of the female (usually on the second day fol-
lowing laparascopy) via the cervical canal.4 The leading IVF
research team in Australia and other research groups have
shown that replacement of two or three embryos, rather than
a single embryo, will substantially increase the chance of
pregnancy. However the replacement of three or more em-
bryos may lead to triplets or even higher order multiple
pregnancies. 5
When embryos are placed in the uterus, they are be-
tween the 2-cell stage and blastocyst (4 or 8-cell stage).6 At
this early stage of development, all of the cells of the embryo
are more or less equivalent. Once more than 16 cells are pre-
sent, however, some distinctions between different types of
cells begin to appear. These distinctions become more pro-
nounced as division and growth continue and form the foun-
dation for later differentiation of cells and organs.7 Approxi-
mately one week after fertilization, the blastocyst attaches to
the uterine wall to continue further development. This stage
is known as "implantation," and is the process during which
the blastocyst sends fingers into the wall of the uterus as
anchors. These fingers are composed of embryonic cells
which manufacture hormones to support pregnancy; they
also form the network of supporting tissues that will eventu-
ally become the placenta, nourishing the developing embryo
and later the fetus. Two weeks after fertilization, the implan-
tation process is complete.8
Clearly, the major benefit to be derived from IVF and
embryo transfer is that it may enable otherwise infertile
women to conceive and to bear children, but the procedure is
not one without risks. The conditions under which the early
embryo is cultured are not of primary concern because the
4. Ethics Advisory Board Report, supra note 2, at 2-3.
5. Tronson, Wood & Leeton, Embryo Research, AGE May 10, 1983, at
11.
6. Edwards & Steptoe, supra note 2 at 1266.
7. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, FERTILIZATION, IMPLANTATION
AND DEVELOPMENT 53 (1984) [hereinafter cited as OTA BACKGROUND
PAPER.]
8. Id.
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early mammalian embryo is highly resistant to damage from
environmental insults. However, damage to the early embryo
could result from aberrant development of ova, selection of
sperm, the fertilization process or the freezing of gametes or
embryos. 9 Specifically, potential sources of damage are the
following:
1. Superovulation may be correlated with an increase
in chromosomal abnormality.10
2. The quality of sperm reaching and fertilizing the
ovum in vitro may differ from the quality of sperm
fertilizing the ovum in the course of natural repro-
duction, since the female reproductive tract selects
against some types of abnormal sperm."'
3. The quantity of sperm reaching the ovum simulta-
neously in vitro may break down the usual block to
fertilization by multiple sperm; a polyploid embryo
may result."'
4. The use of freezing techniques to preserve gametes
or embryos may produce mutations.'
We cannot estimate with certainty the extent to which
each of these sources of risk is likely to occur in clinical appli-
cations of IVF. As in the course of natural reproduction, nat-
ural selection against most embryos with serious chromo-
somal abnormalities seems to occur during pregnancy,
particularly during the first eight weeks following fertiliza-
tion.14 Still, one researcher notes that there is an estimated
three percent additional risk of abnormality in offspring sug-
gested by animal studies, and suggests that such an added risk
would be acceptable, particularly in light of the fact that
some couples who receive genetic counseling are not de-
terred from efforts to conceive children despite twenty-five
percent risks of genetically abnormal offspring. 5 A recogni-
tion of the risks involved in the IVF procedure has prompted
some regulation of the novel treatment.
9. Ethics Advisory Board Report, supra note 2 at 45.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 2.
15. Id. at 46.
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B. Regulation Concerning IVF
The only existing Federal control of human in vitro fer-
tilization is a regulation of the Department of Health and
Human Services concerning the protection of human
subjects.
No application or proposal involving human in vitro fertili-
zation may be funded by the Department or any component
thereof until the application or proposal has been reviewed
by the Ethical Advisory Board and the Board has rendered
advice as to its acceptability from an ethical standpoint.' 6
Two additional general requirements of HHS regulations
presumably apply to research involving human in vitro fertili-
zation as well. All such research conducted or supported by
the Department must be reviewed by a local Institutional Re-
view Board (IRB);17 also, studies involving human IVF should
not be conducted or supported by HHS unless "appropriate
studies on animals and nonpregnant individuals have been
completed."' 8 While other provisions of the HHS regulations
limit "activities directed toward fetuses" 9 as research sub-
jects, "fetus" is clearly defined as that which exists from the
time of implantation.2 0 Therefore, the product of in vitro fer-
tilization is not protected by these provisions prior to transfer
and implantation in the uterus of a host.
Congress imposed a temporary moratorium on federally
sponsored human in vitro fertilization research in 1973, after
the National Institutes of Health received its first request for
a grant for fetal research. The thirteen month moratorium
was technically lifted in 1975, when the Ethics Advisory
Board of the Department of Health and Human Services
(then the Department of Health, Education & Welfare) pro-
posed and published guidelines sanctioning carefully con-
strained research. The findings of the Ethics Advisory Board
16. 45 C.F.R. § 46.204(a) (1985).
17. 46 C.F.R. § 46.205 (1985). It is possible to claim, however that
an IVF program is not research and that no IRB review and approval are
necessary. One can argue that IVF is a treatment that uses a series of tech-
niques, each of which has moved beyond the experimental stage, at least as
far as risks to subjects is concerned. Still, institutions are advised to request
IRB reviews since a procedure with so few successful outcomes is ordinarily
deemed an experiment. See Edgar, The Legal Implications: Are Restraints
Likely?, 20 CONTEMP. OB/GYN 233, 235 (1982).
18. 45 C.F.R. § 46.206(a)(1) (1985).
19. 45 C.F.R. § 46.208-46.209 (1985).
20. 45 C.F.R. § 46.203 (1985).
19861
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
(EAB) have never been accepted by the Secretary of HHS (or
HEW), the EAB has been disbanded, and no Federal grants
have been approved for research on in vitro fertilization.21
There then has been a de facto moratorium on federally
sponsored research on human in vitro fertilization in the
United States since 1975. Nevertheless, there are at least 60
centers and 200 programs which offer the procedure in this
country. Practitioners here have adopted the technology de-
veloped in the United Kingdom and in Australia and have
treated patients who pay considerable fees from private
resources. 22
In contrast to the federal law concerning IVF, restrictive
state laws on fetal research have created barriers to private
practice of in vitro fertilization. Following the U.S. Supreme
Court's 1973 decision regarding abortion, Roe v. Wade,23 nu-
merous state legislatures passed laws restricting or banning
research on fetuses. Many of the state laws explicitly define
the term "fetus" to include an embryo or any product of con-
ception. To the extent that in vitro fertilization, embryo
freezing and other related practices are experiments and fail
to provide clear and immediate therapeutic benefit to the em-
bryo, the fetal research laws may hinder the use of some in-
fertility treatments.2 4
Fourteen of the twenty-five states with fetal research laws
cover research done either in anticipation of or subsequent to
abortion. Others cover only research directed toward a fetus
that exhibits a heartbeat, spontaneous respiratory activity,
spontaneous voluntary muscle movement or pulsation of the
umbilical cord. These laws would not cover in vitro fertiliza-
tion because the procedure does not involve an abortion and,
by the time the fetus exhibits the capabilities mentioned, it is
no longer a subject of ex utero research but rather is develop-
ing in utero in the course of a normal pregnancy.25
Laws more generally banning research on fetuses, how-
ever, might preclude the practice of in vitro fertilization. The
Michigan statute, for example, prohibits research on a live
human embryo if its life or health may be jeopardized. In
Minnesota, the law forbids experimentation on a living
21. Abramowitz, A Stalemate on Test-Tube Baby Research, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Feb. 1984, at 5-9.
22. OTA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 7 at 43.
23. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
24. Andrews, The Stork Market: The Law of the New Reproduction Tech-
nologies, 70 A.B.A. J., Aug. 1984, at 51.
25. Id.
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human conceptus, including one conceived outside the body,
unless scientific evidence has proven that sort of experimen-
tation to be harmless. Statutes in three other states use simi-
lar language.2 1
It is evident that regulation applicable to IVF is by no
means uniform, and according to some, quite inadequate.
Ethicist Paul Ramsey, who testified before the Ethics Advi-
sory Board of the Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare, maintains "that the Ethics Advisory Board, the National
Institutes of Health-and, in absence of action from these
Federal sources, the medical profession itself has any remain-
ing power to enforce standards on the legislatures of the sev-
eral States-should take appropriate action to the extent of
their jurisdictions to stop embryo manipulation as a form of
human genesis. ' '2 7 At this point, what appears to be a politi-
cal or regulatory debate becomes a fierce ethical controversy
in which noted ethicists and theologians have taken polarized
positions.
II. THE ETHICAL DEBATE
While respected ethicists have taken positions similar to
Paul Ramsey's and like him have maintained that "in vitro
fertilization and embryo transfer should not be allowed by
medical policy or public policy in the United States-not
now, not ever, ' 28 others have joined the ranks of Joseph
Fletcher who alleges that "[mlan is a master and a selector
and a designer, and the more rationally contrived and delib-
erate anything is, the more human it is." 9 According to
Fletcher, "[l]aboratory reproduction is radically human com-
26. Id. Andrews notes that the laws restricting fetal research present
an even greater barrier to a practice known as embryo transfer, potentially
prohibiting the process in at least 16 states. Embryo transfer (ET) flushes
an embryo from the uterus of the woman who conceived and places it in
the uterus of another woman. A greater number of statutes would extend
regulation to this procedure rather than to in vitro fertilization because
many of these laws prohibit fetal research in connection with an abortion.
Under most of these laws, the definition of abortion would seem to encom-
pass the flushing technique used in embryo transfer. Hence, where in vitro
fertilization is untouched by statutes that limit their scope to research on
the fetus aborted or intended to be aborted, embryo transfer after in vivo
(in the body) fertilization would appear to fall within the prohibitions.
27. P. Ramsey, On in Vitro Fertilization, 1 (Americans United for
Life Studies in Law and Medicine, No. 3).
28. Id. at 1.
29. Fletcher, Ethical Aspects of Genetic Controls, 285 NEW ENG. J. MED.
776, 781 (1971).
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pared to conception by ordinary sexual intercourse. It is
willed, chosen, purposed and controlled, and surely these are
among the traits that distinguish Homo sapiens from others
in the animal genus, from the primates down." Fletcher con-
cludes that "[c]oital reproduction is, therefore, less human
than laboratory reproduction."3 My purpose in this section
is not to advocate any one ethicist's analysis of the ethics of in
vitro fertilization but rather to present and to evaluate vari-
ous approaches to the issue.
The ethical debate concerning IVF has focused on four
major issues: first, whether an ovum fertilized in vitro be-
comes a human person at the time of fertilization; second,
whether this procedure threatens marriage, the family and
the nature of human parenthood; third, whether IVF "treat-
ment" is too experimental and may produce a damaged
human being; finally what are the long-term consequences of
IVF and of related spin-off practices such as surrogate moth-
erhood, the long-term freezing of embryos, alterations in ge-
netic and chromosomal structures performed upon blasto-
cysts in vitro and nuclear transplantation or cloning. 1 The
remainder of this section will address these four issues
sequentially.
A. The Beginning of Human Life
In a society polarized by the issue of abortion, it is likely
that many who oppose abortion will morally object to the
practice of in vitro fertilization because of the numerous "dis-
cards" the procedure requires." At present, more than one
ovum is fertilized in the course of the procedure, and those
not used for implantation will perish. Others regard the
unimplanted embryo as mere human tissue and have no ob-
jection to the creation and loss of multiple embryos. Yet an-
other group would assess the zygote as between these alterna-
tives-not yet a human person but nonetheless entitled to
respect and protection.
Paul Ramsey believes that fully protectible human life
begins at conception and that discard of human zygotes is the
equivalent of both an early abortion and of murder; Richard
30. Id.
31. See Ethics Advisory Board Report, supra note 2 at 30.
32. Discards are not essential to the IVF procedure. IVF could be
performed either by freezing ova in advance or, during successive men-
strual cycles, by doing successive laparascopies. See R. MCCORMICK, How
BRAVE A NEW WORLD 329 n.41 (1981).
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McCormick also argues for protection of human zygotes,
however he maintains that discard of the zygote is not im-
moral. McCormick claims that when the goal of in vitro fertil-
ization is to study and to experiment upon the product of
conception, we do arguably fail to respect and to protect
early human life; but where the goal of the procedure is to
achieve a pregnancy, the goal is laudable and the means are
appropriate."3 He balances the moral good of procreation
against the moral evil of failing to promote early human life,
and he chooses the procreative good.
McCormick's balancing tests are subject to criticism.
Some critics, such as John Finnis, classify him as a "propor-
tionalist theologist." A proportionalist, according to Finnis,
"threatens ethics by asserting a criterion of moral judgment
which makes moral choice ultimately insignificant. '3 4 Still,
the proportionalist does not avoid moral judgment, rather, he
takes grave responsibility upon himself in choosing his ac-
tions. He views himself as not only responsible for the choices
themselves but for everything that he could affect in making
those choices. The goal of the proportionalist is to choose so
as "to maximize overall net good, on the whole and in the
long run."3 5
Finnis claims that the logically necessary implication of
the proportionalist method is to cease to consider the rights
of the weak and innocent whose very existence impedes the
overall net good. The proportionalist rationalizes compromis-
ing between the overall pursuit of the net good and achieve-
ment of the cultural and moral standards that he chooses to
admire and retain. "Thus he preserves himself from the oth-
erwise inevitable psychological effect of shouldering responsi-
bility for everything: Collapse of any principled moral con-
cern for anything. '"36
McCormick recognizes the value in our culture's moral
interest in protecting human life, but he also recognizes the
value that we place on procreation and on all that fosters that
good, even if artificially as in the case of IVF. How does Mc-
Cormick rationalize or compromise between these two recog-
nized goods so as to benefit the overall net good? First, he
looks to factors that will allow him to attach a value to the
zygote which is inevitably discarded in the course of an IVF
33. Id. at 329.
34. J. FINNIs, FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS 136 (1983).
35. Id.
36. Id.
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procedure.
McCormick refuses to refer to discarded zygotes as abor-
tions. A very high percentage of naturally fertilized ova
never implant in the uterus of the host and are lost. "This
means that there is a tacit acceptance on the part of the
couple that their normal sexual relations will lead to this as
the price of having a child . . . . If it is by no means clear
that couples engaging in normal sexual relations are 'causing
abortions' because foreseeably many fertilized ova do not im-
plant, it is not clear that the discards from artificial proce-
dures must be called 'abortions,' especially if the ratio of oc-
currence is roughly similar."3
A response to this explanation is that man may not artifi-
cially reproduce all that occurs in nature. "Thus, though peo-
ple inevitably die, we do not kill them. Though there are life-
taking earthquakes in nature, we ought not manufacture life-
taking earthquakes.''38 McCormick, however, distinguishes
the replication of nature's disasters from the replication of
nature's achievements which are accompanied by unavoidable
undesirable consequences (the loss of some zygotes) both in
natural and artificial settings. 9 For those who recognize the
zygote as a "person," a reasonable number of "discards"
ought to be sanctioned. If spontaneous loss of a zygote in the
course of normal sexual relations does not violate the zy-
gote's right to life, then loss occurring in artificial attempts to
achieve pregnancy should be similarly acceptable.
Following his analysis of the protectability of human life
at the zygote stage in light of the status of zygotes in the
course of natural reproduction, McCormick has reasoned to
his choice of the procreative good over the good of protect-
ing human life. But Finnis' criticism of proportionalist
choices pierces this choice in particular: in compromising the
37. R. MCCORMICK, supra note 32, at 330.
38. Id.
39. Debate concerning the powers of man to play God is quite com-
plex but revolves in part, upon the validity of various "models" of man.
The "power-plasticity" model of man holds that nature is alien, indepen-
dent of man, possessing no inherent value. It is capable of being used,
dominated and shaped by man. Man sees himself as possessing an un-
restricted right to manipulate nature in the service of his goals. Events like
death are to be outwitted and overcome.
The "sacral-symbiotic" model of man views nature as God's creation, to
be respected and heeded. Man is not the master; rather he is the steward,
and nature is a trust. In secular forms, man is seen as a part of nature. If
man is to be respected, so is nature, and man should live in harmony and
balance with it. Id. at 7.
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rights of embryonic life, McCormick has failed to consider
the rights of the weak and the innocent. He has aided the
-net good," has chosen according to the wishes of those who
have voices and who demand the right to procreate by
whatever means, but he has ignored the voiceless unborn.
The conception of the "net good" is in question. Do the
"heard" voices determine what we perceive and choose to be
the net good, to the extent that the voiceless are virtually
irrelevant?
B. Marriage, The Family and the Nature of Human
Parenthood
"To put radically asunder what God joined together in
making love procreative, to procreate without love or to at-
tempt to establish a relation of sexual love beyond the sphere
of marriage means a refusal of the image of God's creation in
our own." 4 Paul Ramsey's perspective on the inseparability
of the procreative and unitive aspects of sexual love is charac-
teristic of many traditional theologians. Ramsey uses a scrip-
tural base to discover the nature of marriage and of human
parenthood and argues that human procreation mirrors the
original mystery by which God created the world.
God created nothing apart from his love; and without di-
vine love was not anything made that was made. Neither
should there be among man and woman, whose man-wo-
manhood is the image of God, any love set out of the con-
text of responsibility for procreation or any beget-
ting-apart from or beyond the sphere of their love. There
is a reflection of God's love binding himself to the world
and the world to himself to be found in the claim he placed
upon man and woman in their creation when he bound the
nurturing of marital love and procreation together in the
nature of human sexuality.4"
While Paul Ramsey's view is traditional and would pre-
clude the use of IVF which he views as divorcing the procrea-
tive and unitive aspects of sexual love from one another and
from the sexual act, the issue can be approached differently.
When the unitive and procreative purposes are not achieved
in a single sexual act, nonetheless, the spheres of marital love
40. P. Ramsey, One Flesh: A Christian View of Sex Within, Outside
and Before Marriage 15 (Grove Booklet on Ethics No. 8). (1975).
41. Id. at 14.
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and procreation are not radically put asunder when artificial
means are used to achieve pregnancy.4 If the child is
brought into being in the context of marriage and owes its
life to the genetic contributions of a man and woman united
in marriage, this child is the fruit of marital love. Like any
other child, this child is desired by its parents and is joyfully
anticipated within an intimate, marital relationship.
Even moderate theologians agree with those more tradi-
tional in nature in that moving procreation into the labora-
tory undermines the support which sexual parenthood pro-
vides to the monogamous marriage and is both
depersonalizing and dehumanizing. As McCormick has
stated, "by removing the origin of the child from the sphere
of specifically marital (bodily, sexual) love, that love itself is
subtly redefined in a way that deflates the sexual and bodily
and its pertinence to human love, and therefore to the
human itself."'43 Parents breach traditional thought and val-
ues when they limit the notion of love and of parenthood to
desiring and caring for a child, never having coitally engen-
dered that child. Nonetheless, the benefits and positive sup-
port that children provide to marital love and to the family
structure might justify atypical, artificial parenthood and the
engendering of children in laboratory situations.44
A discussion of the ethical debate concerning the effects
of IVF on the nature of human parenthood is incomplete
without consideration of theologians who see neither the
need for debate nor problematic assaults on human
parenthood. Charles Stinson speaks of Paul Ramsey and of
other ethicists similarly distressed by artificial parenthood as
adhering to a faulty theory of creation "which assumes that
God intended certain aspects of natural structures and forces
to remain always beyond the control of man's intelligence."4
Stinson follows the Rahnerian view that man's limitless power
to experiment on himself is a sign of the creative freedom
given to him by God."' Harshly critical of Paul Ramsey, for
maintaining on theological grounds that man's growing
42. See R. MCCORMICK, supra note 32, at 303.
43. Id.
44. While this might appear to be a utilitarian, consequentialist treat-
ment of the problem, it is not truly such. Rather it is an example of "pro-
portionate reasoning" where various risks and benefits are balanced,
weighed and treated accordingly in policy implementation.
45. Stinson, Theology and the Baron Frankenstein: Cloning and Beyond,
89 CHRISTIAN CENTURY, (Jan. 19, 1972), 60, 61.
46. See R. MCCORMICK, supra note 32, at 296.
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power over procreation and other processes of life usurps the
power of the Divine, Stinson claims that Ramsey's ethics are
rooted in fear-fear about the scientific destruction of our
belief in life's ultimate significance.
If mental and spiritual life grows out of brain structures, if
it is not a "separate entity" beyond genetic manipulation,
then such life is somehow not as "true" or "valid" as we
had thought; it is a mere "epiphenomenon." . . . And if
such [Divine] limits are transgressed by man, then either
the Divine Being is "powerless" to stop it-God has been
"dethroned"; or perhaps the Divine is a fiction, an illusion
finally exposed.4 7
Stinson's, Ramsey's and McCormick's positions represent
the extremes and the middle ground respectively which have
characterized the ethical debate on the threat posed by IVF
to the nature of human parenthood. McCormick, the mediat-
ing theologian, is certainly more sympathetic to Ramsey's
view than to Stinson's and believes that while human genesis
need not be sexual to be moral, artificial procreation never-
theless must occur within the covenanted relationship of mar-
riage.46 The logical basis for McCormick's, for Ramsey's, or
for Stinson's position in this area is admittedly weak.
While various warrants, some biblical, some teleological can
be gathered to support that assertion, it remains true that it
cannot be proved by rational arguments or analytical rea-
soning in a totally satisfactory way. This will be viewed as a
fatal weakness only if one fails to realize that in all moral
judgments concerned with basic human values there is a
prethematic and instinctive component that cannot be to-
tally recovered in analytic discourse; for our knowledge of
those values or goods is not first of all discursive. 9
McCormick further explains the "instinctive compo-
nent" of moral reasoning as a "natural sense of the fitness of
things" or as a "spontaneous sense of the rightness or wrong-
47. Stinson, supra note 45, at 61.
48. McCormick maintains that IVF is acceptable if (1) the gametes
are those of husband and wife; (2) embryo wastage is not significantly
higher in the artificial process than it is in vivo (3) the likelihood of fetal
abnormality is no greater than it is in normal procreation; (4) there is no
intention to abort if abnormality does occur. R. MCCORMICK, supra note 32
at 332.
49. Id. at 321.
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ness of things.' 5° While we ideally might expect this "sponta-
neous sense" to lead to uniform moral judgments among
men, this has not been the case in practice. The polarization
of the ethical debate concerning IVF demonstrates that one
person's instinct can foster reasoning and conclusions that
are quite different from those of another. Whether the diver-
sity of moral opinion concerning the effect of IVF on mar-
riage, the family and the nature of human parenthood should
preclude regulation of the area is a complex issue which is
best treated in a later section of this article."' Still, other ethi-
cally problematic issues surround the use of IVF, and some,
such as the risk of producing an abnormal child, produce
more uniform moral judgments and clearer need for regula-
tory action.
C. Human Experimentation
If the IVF procedure involves the risk of damage to a
future child, then IVF is an experiment upon a human and
must comply with codes which govern human experimenta-
tion. While the procedure may early have been subject to
consideration as an experiment upon the mother, her health
risks are statistically minimal. However, risks to the future
child are still in question.
Books of medical ethics contain a wealth of theoretical
and case study discussion concerning the ethics of human ex-
perimentation within the doctor-patient relationship. Gener-
ally, ethical debate focuses on the circumstances in which the
experimenter may imply or construct the consent of an in-
competent or minor patient who is to be the subject of an
experiment which may or may not be relevant to the minor's
treatment. The issue of consent in the context of in vitro fer-
tilization is particularly complex for two reasons. First, it is
not clear whether IVF should be characterized as an experi-
ment or as treatment, and if IVF is experimental in nature,
the second consideration arises. Who or what is the subject of
the IVF experiment and from whom must the researcher ob-
tain or imply consent?
Whether IVF is experimental in nature at this point in
time is certainly debatable and probably doubtful. However
the procedure was unquestionably experimental in its incep-
tion and in its early execution. Those who first attempted
50. Id.
51. See infra Section III.
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IVF could not have known whether they were subjecting a
future human being to unacceptable risks of abnormality. In
fact, the evidence suggests that these early experimenters
proceeded with human IVF before sufficient research on
non-human subjects had been completed. Paul Ramsey once
expressed the "macabre 'hope' that the first child born by
laboratory fertilization would be a bad result-and that it be
well advertised so that all might halt the practice."52 While
IVF may have been unethical in its inception, the question
now is whether it is ethical in its continuation.
Ramsey has written prolifically on the ethics of experi-
mentation upon fetuses and children and his views are appli-
cable to the IVF situation since the subject of the IVF proce-
dure is either one or both of two entities-the blastocyst
and/or the potential future child. If the blastocyst is pro-
tectible human life, then Ramsey would argue that experi-
mentation upon that blastocyst which is non-diagnostic or
non-therapeutic is morally impermissible. He believes that no
adult has the power either to consent by proxy for a child or
to imply the consent of a child to non-therapeutic treatment
because that is "to treat a child as not a child. It is to treat
him as if he were an adult person who has consented to be-
come a joint adventurer in the common cause of medical re-
search. If the grounds for this are alleged to be the presump-
tive or implied consent of the child, that must simply be
characterized as a violent and a false presumption .
When he is grown, the child may put away childish things
and become a true volunteer. ' '58
Whether any form of experimentation upon a blastocyst
is therapeutic in nature and thus permissible under Ramsey's
scheme is a perplexing question. Clearly, Ramsey would pro-
hibit experiments which might be performed upon a blasto-
cyst that is not intended for transfer to the uterus." But
52. P.,Ramsey, supra note 27 at 10.
53. P. RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON 14 (1970).
54. Many studies in experimental embryology do not include embryo
transfer as a component. Several possible goals of laboratory research with
human embryos have been identified:
1. Developing or testing more adequate contraceptives;
2. Determining causes of infertility;
3. Investigating the circumstances leading to the development of hya-
tidiform moles and their potential transformation into malignant
tumors;
4. Evaluating the effect of noxious agents or teratogens on the early
embryo by means of an in vitro screening system;
5. Studying the mechanisms by which chromosomal abnormalities are
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whether the IVF procedure which contemplates embryo
transfer is "therapeutic" rather than purely experimental to
the blastocyst or to the potential resultant child is a vexing
issue. To answer "yes" is to claim that life itself is therapeutic
to a non-existent entity. It is absurd to imply consent from
that which does not exist and to seek consent to life is an
equally odd proposition. In any event, Ramsey maintains that
we cannot submit a child to procedures that involve risks of
harm, and since IVF is not definitively risk-free, submission
of the potential child to risk (even before it has become a
child) would be unacceptable.
Richard McCormick's views on experimentation differ
from Paul Ramsey's. Both McCormick and Ramsey accept
proxy consent as legitimate in the therapeutic situation be-
cause life and health are goods that a child would choose be-
cause he ought to choose them. Proxy consent is morally valid
insofar as it is a reasonable presumption of the child's wishes,
a construction of what the child would wish if he could do so.
According to McCormick, however, once we analyze proxy
consent in the therapeutic situation in this manner, the fol-
lowing question arises: "Are there other things that a child
ought, as a human being, to choose precisely because and in-
sofar as they are goods definitive of his well being?" 55 McCor-
mick's intent to benefit the "net good" surfaces when he sug-
gests that we ought to do some things for others simply
because we are members of the human community. "These
are not precisely works of charity or supererogation . . . but
our personal bearing of our share that all may prosper."56
None of these implied choices should involve risk, discomfort
or inconvenience. If IVF is a procedure without "notable
risk," then McCormick's analysis would permit an IVF re-
searcher to construct the consent of a blastocyst to live, to
become a human child because life is a value that it ought to
choose to benefit its parents and the society of which it has
the opportunity to be a part. Again, one must question Mc-
Cormick's balancing of the interests of society and of the net
good against the weak and innocent-children who cannot
consent to experimentation.
produced; and
6. Investigating the toti potential cells of very early embryos to increase
understanding of normal and abnormal cell growth and
differentiation.
See Ethics Advisory Board Report, supra note 2 at 22.
55. R. MCCORMICK, supra note 32 at 76.
56. Id.
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D. Future Applications of IVF
Ethicists have expressed concern that the potential fu-
ture application and abuses of IVF procedures undermine
any ethical propriety of present IVF practices. Each potential
future application of IVF raises its own host of legal and ethi-
cal problems which must remain beyond the scope of this ar-
ticle. However, an understanding of the need for regulation
of IVF follows from an awareness of the possible long-term
implications of laboratory genesis.
In the December 14, 1983 edition of the Australian Can-
berra Times, Professor Carl Wood, head of the Queen Victo-
ria Medical Centre In-Vitro Fertilisation Team, said that his
team had rejected requests from overseas to grow human em-
bryos for "spare parts." He claimed, "We've had two over-
seas approaches-I can't say who-from people who believe
the in vitro techniques could be used to grow embryos be-
yond the five or seven-day stage that we have limited our-
selves to. The idea is [that] the organs or tissue of two to
three-week-old embryos could be used for spare-part surgery.
Although this might be of great benefit to many ill people, it
would result in the death of the embryo." '
The growth of embryos for spare parts is but one of the
futuristic possibilities introduced by the IVF procedure. The
alteration of genetic and chromosomal structures which
could be performed in the laboratory prior to embryo trans-
fer is not a remote possibility. As human life is increasingly
and successfully cultured in laboratories, the means of con-
trolling genetic traits become available to scientists. If human
gene therapy is approved for use, it will first be performed on
patients who suffer from severe, rapidly fatal diseases caused
by defective genes.58 While inherited alterations, the most
controversial applications of gene therapy, are unlikely to be
undertaken in humans in the near future, gene transfer ex-
periments in animals have produced some inherited
changes59 and application to humans seems scientifically pos-
sible. Species barriers have already been broken by transplan-
tation of human genes into certain agricultural animals,60 and
the formation of human/animal hybrids or chimeras is not in
the realm of the impossible. Nuclear transplantation or clon-
ing, the long-term freezing of embryos, and perhaps the sub-
57. Victoria Lifts In-Vitro Ban, Canberra Times, Dec. 14, 1983.
58. OTA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 7, at iii.
59. Id. at 1.
60. Id. at 52 (technical note #3).
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stitution of laboratory genesis for human procreation from
first to last are remaining future prospects. A final spin-off
practice of IVF which is already prevalent in the United
States is that of surrogate motherhood. This practice has al-
ready raised serious ethical, legal and policy issues.
III. THE POLICY QUESTIONS
While the concern of ethics or morality is the rightness
or wrongness of human conduct, the realm of public policy is
the common good. When human acts have ascertainable pub-
lic consequences, they become the proper concerns of society
and appropriate subjects for policy regulation. When the
rightness or wrongness of the human conduct sought to be
regulated is subject to ethical debate, as in the case of IVF,
the development of policy for the "common good" is
unenviably difficult since any "good" pursued is not per-
ceived by all as "common."
The Federal moratorium on IVF research in the United
States did not prevent the development of in vitro fertiliza-
tion technology or its clinical application, although its pro-
gress has probably been slowed. There is some concern that
the technology has developed with an unusual lack of federal
oversight and that independent researchers have skipped de-
sirable preliminary steps before using the IVF procedure on
humans.61 Evidence suggests that while researchers per-
formed experiments on lower mammals, they failed to suffi-
ciently research IVF procedures on non-human primates
before commencement of human clinical applications.6" Ex-
periments have not been subject to the National Institutes of
Health's (NIH) peer review process and "may have circum-
vented systematic accumulation of knowledge." 63 Further-
more, the Federal Government may have lost some opportu-
nity to monitor and control the technology by failing to
sponsor research or at least to provide a mechanism for fed-
eral oversight."
Although we cannot reverse the mistakes of the past, we
can avoid future consequences of inadequately supervised
IVF if we implement policy which can guide further efforts in
reproductive technology. It may have been possible and per-
haps wise to impose a moratorium on human IVF two de-
61. OTA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 7, at 43.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 152.
64. Id. at 151-53.
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cades ago, but it is too late to examine the benefits of an ab-
solutist approach to the regulation of the technology. The
availability of IVF, like the availability of many commodities
and opportunities in our society, has induced a demand. That
demand has become intractable, and in the case of IVF, it
asks for recognition as a legal right." The goals of policy in
the IVF arena should emphasize control and containment of
present applications and procedures. 6
If and as policy makers develop regulation pertaining to
IVF, they must address three questions which will be treated
sequentially in the remainder of this section. First, should
and can we govern morality? Second, can we govern science?
It is critical, however, that the policy maker recognize that
IVF is not exclusively a "moral issue" nor is it strictly a scien-
tific procedure; rather it is a medical-technological advance-
ment that has the capacity to affect not only those who avail
themselves of the treatment but also all members of society.
Having such potential, IVF appropriately enters the province
of public concern and policy control. Once the policy maker
has overcome the questions surrounding the government of
science and morality, he faces the task of development of ac-
ceptable policy. In this capacity, he inevitably encounters the
final question to be addressed in this section-that of distrib-
utive justice.
A. Governing Morality
The propriety of policy regulation of morally controver-
sial conduct has received much attention in recent years. Just
as abortion and abortion funding decisions' 7 have divided our
nation, so could decisions concerning the use of in vitro fertil-
ization as a cure for infertility. Both situations involve pre-
nascent "life" and the rights to procreative privacy.68
In attempting to develop sound policy, policy makers are
generally bound by moral pluralism and cultural pragmatism:
First, a word on moral pluralism: If policy controlling IVF
permits the use of the procedure (within bounds), it will inev-
65. See infra Section IV.
66. Regulation of numerous potential "spin-off' practices of IVF,
such as surrogate motherhood, commercial traffic in human tissue, cultiva-
tion of life in the lab beyond the blastocyst stage and long-term freezing of
gametes and embryos, ought to be of paramount importance.
67. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
68. See infra section IV.
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itably enrage those who believe that life begins at the mo-
ment of fertilization (and that discarded embryos are unac-
ceptable), that any non-therapeutic experiment on a child is
abhorrent or that the link between sex and procreation is in-
dissoluble. On the other hand, if policy makers accommodate
the beliefs of these "Ramseyesque" persons, they will infuri-
ate countless infertile individuals who wish to conceive a child
and who may believe that life begins not at fertilization but at
implantation (and that discarded embryos are acceptable),
that the IVF experiment is either "therapeutic" to the future
child, or if non-therapeutic, is nonetheless acceptable because
the child ought to wish to live and the parental proxy consent
to life of the child is therefore valid. Walking the line be-
tween these diverse moral opinions is the difficult task of the
policy maker.
When moral pluralism results in a deadlock, cultural
pragmatism might enlighten the developer of new policy. For
better or for worse, our culture is one where technology is
highly esteemed; where moral judgments tend to collapse
into pragmatic cost-benefit calculation; where youth, health,
pleasure and comfort are highly valued; where maladapta-
tions, such as senility, retardation or age are treated destruc-
tively rather than by adapting the environment to special
needs."B "Morality often translates into efficiency, ' ' 77 and this
mentality constricts the shaping of policy. These "cultural"
limitations may serve as welcomed guidance to a policy maker
who otherwise has boundless freedom in making his policy
choices and whose culturally unrestricted choice may be
neither feasible nor popular.
It seems that ethicists would have little concern for cul-
tural pragmatism and would urge that public policy incorpo-
rate the "right" values regardless of the popularity of the
policy thus formed or even of the ultimate feasibility of its
use in society. Yet, Richard McCormick agrees that "what ac-
tions ought to be controlled by policy is determined not
merely by the immorality of the action, but beyond this by a
single criterion: feasibility. Feasibility is that quality whereby
a proposed course of action is not merely possible but practi-
cable, adaptable, depending on the ways, attitudes, traditions
of a people.' 71
69. See McCormick, supra note 32, at 84.
70. id.
71. Id. quoting Micallef, Abortion and the Principles of Legislation, 28
LAVAL THkOLOGIQUE ET PHILOSOPHIQUE 294 (1972).
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McCormick's testimony concerning the regulation of bio-
technology before the House's Science and Technology Com-
mittee on August 9, 1984, maintains, in part, that we must
regulate only insofar as society will accept that regulation. He
asks:
1) Will the law be obeyed?
2) Is it enforceable against the disobedient?
3) Is it prudent to undertake enforcement in view of
the possibility of harmful effects in other areas of
social life?72
Most likely, bans of the IVF procedure would neither be
obeyed nor be enforceable and the possibility of harmful ef-
fects from "backstreet" IVF practices might weigh heavily
against encouragement of a ban. It is certainly possible that
more limited and feasible restrictions on IVF would be
obeyed, enforced and beneficial to society as a whole.
It seems that the feasibility of policy implementation
must be recognized as a constraint on policy development.
While jurisprudential theory takes issue with the notion that
the law is defined by the extent of its acceptance in the gov-
erned society, this dispute is beyond the scope of this article.
Certainly, the law historically has been man's effort to en-
force moral and ethical concepts, but to have any practical
impact, the law cannot stand as an idyllic values system which
the governed refuse to adopt. When governing morally con-
troversial behavior, the law must react to social needs and de-
mands, compromising-not conforming.
B. Governing Science
In vitro fertilization is not only an ethically debatable pro-
cedure-it is a scientific procedure, and governing science,
like governing morality, is a problematic and controversial
prospect. Science is a profession which shares features in
common with law and medicine. Among the shared features
are rigorous educational requirements for entry, the author-
ity of internal bodies over the conduct of members of the
profession and hostility to unwarranted lay involvement in
72. Human Embryo Transfer: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investiga-
tions and Oversight of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 313 (1984) (statement of Richard McCormick, Professor of Chris-
tian Ethics, Kennedy Institute of Ethics) (citing J.C. MURRAY, WE How
THESE TRUTHS 166-67 (1960)).
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the profession.7 8 Dr. R.G. Edwards, the reknowned IVF re-
searcher at Cambridge, has questioned whether anything
needs to be done to regulate the application of new scientific
advances. He claims that the difficulty with both civil and
criminal sanctions on the scientific profession "is that they all
contain an implicit direction, 'Ask permission before you do
your research.' Scientific research began to make progress
only when it no longer had to ask permission of the church
and it has come a long way since then.' If regulation is in-
evitable, Dr. Edwards prefers that it emphasize "individual
and private action, inquiry and consultation, not . . . author-
ity, control bureaucracy or 'laws with teeth'." 75 Even if "laws
with teeth" are in place, individual doctors, according to Ed-
wards, have placed the interests of their patients ahead of
those decreed by society as demonstrated in the cases of abor-
tions executed in the face of severely repressive laws. Ed-
wards' attitude demonstrates that scientists can be recalci-
trant and difficult subjects to regulate. 6
As scientists have strived for immunity from regulation,
the public has not fought forcefully to impose control. The
public has failed to scrutinize science perhaps in awe of its
seemingly magical powers and perhaps in the belief that sci-
ence is a rational, objective search for truth that is inherently
beneficial. Today, however, a formerly "pure" science is ex-
tensively controlled by the needs and demands of technology,
73. See Ben-David, The Profession of Science and its Powers, 10 MINERVA
362 (1972).
74. Edwards & Sharpe, Social Values and Research in Human Embryol-
ogy, 231 NATURE 88 (1971).
75. Id. at 89.
76. It is unfair to characterize all scientists as hostile to regulation of
their profession. Dr. Nightingale claims that
[e]xperiences with the recombinant DNA Advisory Committee
...where the single-minded desire for unhampered research was
often obvious - lead me to the conclusion that some kind of
oversight mechanism for future research and its applications in
this field is not only desirable but necessary. Applications of ge-
netic engineering to man have wide societal and personal, intimate
implications and cannot be left to researchers or practitioners
alone no matter how well-meaning . . . .The implications of ge-
netic engineering for health care in early life need to be moni-
tored by persons other than those interested in promoting new
technologies.
See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House
Comm. on Science & Technology, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 500-01 (1982) (state-
ment of Dr. Elena Nightingale, Senior Scholar-in-Residence, Institute of
Medicine, National Academy of Sciences).
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and technology is not so benign an enterprise as pure science.
An MIT biologist has cited three factors which have en-
couraged science to serve technological development: The
first is the availability of funding, the second is the domi-
nance of influential scientists in the technological establish-
ment, and the third factor is feasibility." Research will be
done if it is feasible to do so regardless of other considera-
tions. For example Edward Teller stated his belief in the pos-
sibility of developing the thermonuclear bomb and that his
scientific duty demanded exploration of that possibility.78
Such attitudes forcefully demonstrate not only the urgent
need for the regulation of science but also that regulation
may in some cases be impossible.
The profound impact that technology has had on our so-
ciety justifies stringent regulation of the enterprise but the
form which that regulation should take is uncertain. Barry R.
Furrow has contended that private rather than public action
can deal effectively with scientific risks and that private tort
litigation can be a powerful regulatory tool.79 Furrow would
like to return nuisance law to its historical role as a device for
technology control and would couple a "risk-averse" strain of
nuisance law8" with expanded powers of the judiciary to curb
undesirable technological advancement. Supportive of what
he calls Joel Yellin's "Elitist, Judicial Oversight Model," Fur-
row outlines Yellin's proposed "committee of standing mas-
ters, a high technology review panel, to assist courts review-
ing agency decisions in areas of technological complexity." '81
According to Yellin, Federal courts could refer complex
77. See E. SINGER, GENE MANIPULATION AND THE ROLE OF SCIENCE 72
(1972).
78. Id. at 75-76.
79. Furrow, Governing Science: Public Risks and Private Remedies, 131
U. PA. L. REV. 1403 (1983).
80. Furrow would like to redirect the emphasis of nuisance law so
that the severity of the hazard involved rather than the probability of harm
substantially affects the nuisance calculus:
If the judicial framework is oriented toward a probability -
weighted calculus, ignoring high gravity results if the probabilities
seem low enough, the consequences, even if potentially cata-
strophic, will be experienced as trivial to be ignored by a 'rational'
decisionmaker. But if the judicial framework for nuisance law is
oriented toward consequences, considering catastrophic impacts as
a central concern, then public actions derived from private entitle-
ments will be brought into line with modern legislation and con-
temporary concerns about potential irreversible catastrophe.
Id. at 1454.
81. Id. at 1435.
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questions to the standing masters, a committee of scientists,
lawyers and engineers. While the regulation of the scientific
field is not a simple matter, Fuller demonstrates that creative
policy makers can discover appropriate methods-both pri-
vate and public-to control and contain the technological
enterprise. 8
C. Questions of Distributive Justice
IVF is no longer an esoteric technique but is one that
will be available to the majority of the one million infertile
women in this country; however the costs of the procedure
are prohibitive to many. Patients usually pay $3000 to $4000
for each attempt to conceive and each attempt-at the well-
established medical centers-has a 15 to 20 percent chance
of success. Thus, a woman might invest $9000 to $12,000 for
three attempts and for less than a 50 percent chance of be-
coming pregnant.83 Insurance companies either refuse to pay
for the procedure or will pay for only portions of the medical
costs, such as the hospitalization fees." On September 25,
82. To imply that 1VF is a "technological enterprise" may seem to
overstate the nature of what some view as a simple medical procedure. On
the other hand, reproductive interventions can be characterized as techno-
logical and even industrial in nature. Fertility and Genetics Research, Inc.
is a Chicago based operation which has applied for patents on the embryo
transfer procedure as well as the equipment used in the transfer. Some,
such as Professor George Annas of the Boston University School of Public
Health, have called the potential patenting of the procedure "outrageous."
"How can you patent human reproduction?" asked Annas. But, Lawrence
Sucsy, Chairman of the Board at Fertility and Genetics Research claims
that patenting of medical procedures is not at all unusual - kidney dialysis
is one example. See Embryo Transfer: Patent Pending, 2 FERTILITY ASSISTANCE
1 (1984).
If the patent is granted, it would enable the sponsoring corporation to
limit the application of surrogate embryo transfer to those who obtained a
license. Such limitation might increase costs and diminish access to the
technology, but might also permit enhanced quality and controlled diffu-
sion of the procedure. See OTA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 7, at 44.
83. There is no shortage of people waiting to pay for the IVF proce-
dure. At Eastern Virginia Medical School in Norfolk, the first place in this
country to offer IVF, patients are scheduled six months ahead of time, and
there are 3000 to 4000 patients waiting. Since Eastern Virginia can handle
only 270 patients per year, this represents more than a 10-year backlog. See
Kolata, In Vitro Fertilization Goes Commercial, 221 SCIENCE 1160 (1983).
84. Id. Papers distributed to patients in the "MacDonald In Vitro
Fertilization Program" at University Hospitals of Cleveland warn that com-
ponents of the IVF procedure not covered by insurance include fertiliza-
tion, incubation and embryo transfer. Insurance may cover: 1) induction of
ovulation including daily ultrasound scans, hormonal medications, lab fees;
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1984, the Director of the Office of Health Maintenance Or-
ganizations (OHMO) imposed an additional constraint on the
availability of the IVF procedure when he decided to allow
federally qualified HMO's the option of excluding in vitro fer-
tilization from the basic health services that they are required
to provide their members."
As IVF becomes increasingly available to those who can
afford it, questions of distributive justice arise. If the right86
to bear children is afforded to those who presently pay
thousands of dollars for a mere chance to conceive, should
not the same opportunities exist for those of lesser means
who possess the same interest and right to beget children? In
our society, notions of distributive justice are rooted in egali-
tarian theory which maintains that it is discriminatory "to
treat people differently in ways that profoundly affect their
lives because of differences for which they have no responsi-
bility.""7 Typically, we do not classify persons based upon
wealth and then proceed to treat them unequally because of
this difference. If IVF is a scarce medical procedure which
can be provided to a very few, we arguably ought not let
pure market forces control its availability and must offer the
benefits of the procedure to those of lesser means.
Any policy decision concerning the allocation of the IVF
procedure must consider both questions of macro- and micro-
allocation.8 Macroallocation decisions consider how much of
society's resources should be exchanged for a certain good
(IVF in this case). In the province of medical research and
treatment, policy makers must consider which categories of
illness or disease should receive priority in the allocation of
medical resources if it is not possible to fund research and
therapy in all areas.
There are two distinct positions on the macroallocation
2) laparascopy with egg retrieval; 3) anesthesia professional fee for laparas-
copy; 4) hospital fee (operating room and hospital room, recovery room,
thechnical anesthesia).
85. 49 Fed. Reg. 39,109 (1984). The Director, OHMO, has author-
ized the exclusion of IVF from basic health services because "this service,
at the present time, is unusual, infrequently provided, and not necessary
for the protection of individual health."
86. See infra Section IV.
87. T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
183 (1979).
88. Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt have dubbed these questions
as "first-order" and "second-order" determinations, respectively. See G.
CALABRESI & P. BoBarir, TRAGIC CHOICES 19 (1978).
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issue.8 9 One is that we should not spend federal funds for in
vitro fertilization and embryo transfer in clinical practice.
Reasons given for this position vary from the view that the
importance of bearing a child that is genetically "one's own"
has been overstated9 to the belief that other approaches to
infertility will be more cost-effective or to the view that sig-
nificant moral opposition to IVF ought to prohibit use of tax-
payers' money to promote human IVF and embryo
transfer.91
In contrast, the second position maintains that the fed-
eral government should support the clinical application of
IVF because involuntary infertility is a serious problem. "The
rabbis put it this way, some fifteen centuries ago. Four are
considered as if they were dead: the poor, the diseased, the
blind, and the childless."92 Federal support of IVF research
89. See Ethics Advisory Board Report, supra note 2 at 52.
90. Id. This view maintains that the substantial investment of public
funds to develop anti-infertility techniques, particularly in light of other
"immense needs of our society," (for example, the provision of an effective
clotting factor for hemophiliacs) is inappropriate. As Gorovitz claims:
In the competition for support, the burden of making a convinc-
ing case should rest with the proponent of a given line of work.
With forty million Americans having no adequate access to decent
health care, with thousands of children born annually without
prospect of a family to nurture them, with venereal disease - a
major cause of infertility on the rise, it is implausible that research
into making IVF more readily and reliably available should be a
project of high priority concern. It isn't so much the harm or risk
it involves as the plainly greater importance of addressing more
fundamental and widespread problems of health and the delivery
of health care.
Id. at 53.
91. Paul Ramsey, on the distributive justice question has said:
[He] who can wish this [IVF] to become a "standard medical prac-
tice" must want both our present health care delivery system
(which is largely funded) and any future national health plan to be
profoundly oppressive to consciences . . . . In the future, the
"distributive justice" argument will stand alone, no matter what
the cost of perfecting and delivering this service, or the cost of
having done so in supporting the children so produced. I don't
suppose that in years to come we are going to prohibit women on
welfare from overcoming oviduct blockage, or refuse to fund this
medical service, simply because of the cost in ADC payments. Of
course, conscientious objectors to funding abortion or funding pe-
tri dish discarding do not think highly of this argument, since for
them it is meaningless to speak of fairness in justly distributing an
immoral practice.
P. Ramsey, supra note 27, at 6.
92. Ethics Advisory Board Report, supra note 2 at 52.
[Vol. 2
IN VITRO FERTILIZATION
and practice would facilitate federal regulation of the proce-
dure, a result which must be considered as an advantage. Fi-
nally, "[i]t would be a sad commentary on the American
ethos if federal funds could be used for the taking of human
life, that is, therapeutic abortion, but not the creation of
human life, that is therapeutic conception." 98
If infertility is recognized as a serious problem or if in
the interests of egalitarianism, public policy supports Federal
funding of the IVF procedure, issues of microallocation arise.
Microallocation decisions or "second-order determinations"
decide "who shall get what is made." 4 Public policy gov-
erning microallocation of IVF must determine both who will
make the allocation decisions and what criteria will be used
for selection of the recipients. First, it is not fair to ask the
physician to be a policy maker. "A physician or other pro-
vider must do all that is permitted on behalf of his patient
without counting society's resources and without taking into
account the range of factors, e.g. statistical lives, that policy
makers rightfully should consider.""5
Calabresi and Bobbitt have recognized the tendency of
our society to entrust many difficult decisions to decentral-
ized, aresponsible agencies or juries." Delegation of microal-
location decisions concerning IVF to such a body may be the
best course as we develop regulation of IVF. A "jury" could
sit in all centers which would be granted Federal funds for
IVF and would consider and choose among applicants for the
procedure.
The use of such a jury would not meet with agreement
from all quarters. As Calabresi and Bobbitt have noted, the
aresponsible agency makes decisions and gives no reasons for
them, "[a]nd giving no reasons, it avoids, or at least miti-
gates, the conflict between the wish to recognize differences
and the desire to affirm egalitarianism in all its forms."" If
the decisions of juries follow a discernible pattern, they will
be criticized, for the pattern is evidence of bias. On the other
hand, "the lack of a pattern is taken as clear evidence that
each case is decided merely on the basis of favoritism."98
93. Id.
94. G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, supra note 88, at 19.
95. See T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 87, at 195. See also,
H. Hiatt, Protecting the Medical Commons: Who is Responsible?, 293 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 235 (1975).
96. See G. CALABRESI & P. BoBBITT, supra note 88, at 57.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 64.
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We face, then, three possibilities. Either we abandon alto-
gether the use of aresponsible agencies, or we try to modify
them further, or we restructure the allocation into the
sort of decision made in the criminal law, that is, we trans-
form the situation from an allocation requiring an assess-
ment of relative worthiness to a decision requiring a deter-
mination of absolute worthiness or absolute fault, which can
be satisfactorily assigned to a true jury."
One goal of policy in the IVF area should be the develop-
ment of fair and useful criteria which might aid the determi-
nations of "absolute worthiness" or "absolute fault" as we
strive for an equitable distribution of funding for IVF.
IV. THE LEGAL DILEMMAS
Legislators are the policy makers who must address the
considerations outlined in the preceding section. Yet initial
regulation of IVF may not be the product of legislative ac-
tion. While our system designed legislatures to address and to
implement policy in the first instance, the events of the past
thirty years have demonstrated that the courts are leaders in
policy implementation. Courts often have ruled where legisla-
tures should have acted to determine cutting-edge policy.
School desegregation, equal employment opportunities, vot-
ing rights, abortion and capital punishment are issues that
the courts have addressed and are areas in which the judici-
ary has served as the primary source of policy and values.
How might the courts first be called upon to address the
IVF issue? It is likely that litigants will raise constitutional
questions concerning any attempted regulation of IVF. The
recognized constitutional right to privacy is the most obvious
constitutional issue involved in any regulation of procreative
activity, but the character of the attempted regulation may
well foster equal protection claims. Actions in tort are other
vehicles by which IVF may come before the courts. If a child
born of the IVF process should be genetically abnormal or
injured, either the child or parents could foreseeably bring
an action in tort, claiming substantial damages. This section
will address both the constitutional issues and the tort impli-
cations surrounding the use of IVF.
99. Id.
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A. The Constitutional Issues
1. The Constitutional Right to Privacy
The Constitution of the United States does not refer to
privacy, but it has been recognized by the courts as a funda-
mental right. In Whalen v. Roe,' °° Justice Stevens categorized
the Court's recognition of a right to privacy as follows: (1)
freedom from governmental surveillance and intrusion as
protected by the Fourth Amendment; (2) the interest in
avoiding public disclosure of private matters; and (3) the in-
terest in making independent personal decisions in matters
concerning marriage, procreation, and childrearing.010 The
category that is pertinent to the use of IVF is clearly the
third, and a line of cases has protected the right to privacy in
making independent decisions concerning procreation.
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court struck down a stat-
ute prohibiting the sale of contraceptives as "repulsive to the
notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship."102
Eisenstadt v. Baird,103 took the Griswold decision further and
refused to allow a State to forbid the distribution of contra-
ceptives to unmarried persons. Such regulation would treat
unmarried people differently than married people, whose
right to use contraceptives had been established in Griswold,
and would be arbitrary and in violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question
inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is
not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own,
but an association of two individuals each with a separate in-
tellectual and emotional 'makeup. If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the deci-
sion whether to bear or beget a child.'"
Whether the courts will view access to IVF as a funda-
mental right depends upon how closely analogous it is to the
sexual privacy rights already recognized by the Supreme
Court. It is arguable that once genetic material is outside of
the body, the privacy interest of the possessor has been atten-
100. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
101. Id. at 599-600.
102. 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1964).
103. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
104. Id. at 453.
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uated. Furthermore, the Court has never encountered a situ-
ation in which it has been asked to protect procreative liberty
outside of the context of sexual reproduction. If, however,
the right to beget children by IVF is recognized as a funda-
mental right, the government would have to demonstrate a
compelling state interest to justify interference with the exer-
cise of that right. On the other hand, if the right asserted is
less than fundamental, the government could limit the exer-
cise of the right on the showing of a rational basis for the
restriction. Rational bases that might justify governance of
aspects of IVF include the protection of early human em-
bryos, the government's interest in fostering marriage and
the insuperable legal problems that would arise from spin-off
practices of the technology, such as the use of surrogate
mothers or the development of eugenic engineering. How-
ever, it is doubtful that these state interests are "compelling,"
and IVF will be more easily regulated if courts determine
that access to the procedure is less than a fundamental
right.10 5
2. Equal Protection
If, in the interests of distributive justice or in the pursuit
of Federal control over IVF, Federal funds are provided for
IVF treatment, then the government could become the tar-
get of equal protection litigants who may be excluded, for
various reasons, from the availability of the IVF procedure.
If, for example, future regulation of IVF limits its availability
to married couples,106 a claim of discrimination based upon
marital status would be the foreseeable equal protection suit.
In light of the Eisenstadt decision, which upheld "the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child," such a claim might well be successful.
B. Liability-in Tort
Courts will likely encounter claims against physicians and
105. See generally Ethics Advisory Board Report, supra note 2, at 63-
64.
106. Australian policy, in line with a recommendation by the Stand-
ing Attorneys General, will offer in vitro services to couples with "estab-
lished de facto relationships." See Bills Open In vitro to Unmarried Couples,
AGE, March 22, 1984.
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institutions for IVF claims that have gone awry. In the past
decade, a body of law has evolved concerning physicians' and
laboratories' responsibility for failure of sterilization proce-
dures and for prenatal injuries and it is probable that IVF
suits would be resolved in accordance with this law.
If a physician has negligently directed the selection of de-
fective ova or semen or has negligently supervised or per-
formed the implantation of a defective blastocyst which de-
velops to term, he could become the subject of a wrongful
life action which is initiated by the parents of the injured or
defective child. American courts have hesitated to recognize
this cause of action against negligent physicians, but since
IVF involves the affirmative acts of a human agent who is not
a parent of the offspring, a new judicial approach may evolve.
Still, proof of causation in these cases would be difficult if not
impossible and would limit recovery to be gained from these
suits.
It is not inconceivable that causes of action for wrongful
death could be extended to permit recovery for wrongful de-
struction of an unimplanted blastocyst. Judicial recognition of
such a cause of action would undermine Roe v. Wade, and
would accord respect and protection to very early forms of
human life. A third claim, that of wrongful birth, might be
initiated by a child born of IVF who claims that he should
never have been born and would not have been born but for
the negligence of the physician against whom the action is
asserted. However, to date, only California and Washington
recognize suits for wrongful birth.
Courts will continue to struggle with questions of hold-
ing health care professionals accountable for their actions,
and it is likely that the focus will be on the proper calculation
of damages in these novel tort claims. Since the applicability
of traditional tort concepts to research involving IVF is un-
certain, one lawyer has proposed the establishment of a fed-
eral compensation fund to provide monetary redress in the
event of injury associated with such research.101 In her view,
society has a substantial interest in the establishment of a pro-
gram of human IVF and therefore has an obligation to the
human subjects who may be injured by participation in the
program.
Any injury which is not clearly unrelated to participation in
the IVF program would be compensable. The amount of
107. Id. at 75.
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compensation would be determined by calculating the mon-
etary requirements for making the situation of a damaged
child or mother equal to that of a normal person, insofar as
such calculation is possible. The compensation fund would
be financed through premiums paid by researchers or their
institutions, by adding a surcharge to hospital bills, or by
allocating general revenues to this purpose. The plan would
include financial incentives to encourage the exercise of
due care by investigators and institutions.?"
When a physician or institution undertakes any novel
medical procedure, as IVF, his legal duties towards his pa-
tients are particularly confusing. Whether a new procedure,
such as IVF, should be characterized as treatment or as an ex-
periment will determine, in part, the scope of duties and liabil-
ities. What degree of risk is appropriate in treatment and ex-
perimental situations? Is and should permissible risk be the
same in both situations? In fact, should IVF be performed at
all? Is any risk to the resulting child unacceptable? While
there is no evidence yet of abnormality in IVF offspring, it
will be several years before we can determine if IVF children
-are different from the general population. It is indeed diffi-
cult for physicians to behave according to standards of the
profession in novel, unexplored areas of medicine because
there are no such standards-all is in a state of evolution.
The sooner that minimum standards for programs in IVF are
imposed, the easier it will be for doctors to ascertain degrees
of permissible risk and duties toward patients. The need for
incorporating these minimal standards in legislation concern-
ing IVF is apparent and should be welcomed by members of
both the legal and medical professions.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR THE REGULATION OF IVF
Both the United Kingdom and Australia have appointed
commissions to recommend standards and regulations for the
practice of IVF. The United States ought to follow the model
established by these countries and begin inquiry into the
practice of IVF in this country. The ironies of the discoveries
of a commission might surprise physicians and lay persons
alike. For example, "[i]t is ironic that the screening of donor
sperm for Al [artificial insemination] is much less stringent
than that of bull sperm in the cattle industry."10 9
108. Id.
109. Andrews, supra note 24, at 51.
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The recommendations of the United Kingdom's War-
nock Committee, published in July of 1984, establish strict
guidelines and significant limitations on the practice of
IVF.110 Among its many provisions are several which are in-
cluded in an appendix to this article and which the United
States would be wise to adopt as it formulates policy concern-
ing IVF. The Warnock Committee suggests that a statutory
licensing authority be established to regulate both research
and services concerning in vitro fertilization. It urges caution
in the use of frozen embryos until further research has
demonstrated the safety of procedures involving these em-
bryos. As to experimentation on embryos not intended for
transfer and as to the disposal of spare embryos, the Commit-
tee again offers needed guidance. Other important issues ad-
dressed by the Warnock Committee include trans-species fer-
tilization, surrogacy, commercial traffic in human tissue and
the use of donor gametes. The appendix to this article also
suggests provisions not included in the Warnock guidelines
but which would be wise to adopt in this country.
IN CONCLUSION
Proponents of regulation of IVF may be accused of too
great a futurism in their fears of possible risks and undesir-
able applications of new technology. Joseph Fletcher has criti-
cized "[p]eople who appeal to Brave New World and 1984
and Fahrenheit 457 . . . . [Tihe tyranny is set up first and
then genetic controls are employed. The problem of misuse
is political not biological." ' Nonetheless, recent events have
demonstrated that the biological threats are very real. In an
age when industries are applying to patent reproductive
processes, when nations are asking physicians to grow em-
bryos for spare parts, and when women are leasing their
wombs, the Brave New World analogy is not entirely
inappropriate.
The prescience of the law in the area of IVF will pre-
clude future abuses of this novel technology. Certainly, the
law can recognize the interests of the many infertile couples
who wish to conceive children and who encounter ten year
waiting lists at IVF clinics across the country. Yet, uniform
legislation should govern private and public practices of IVF
I 10. See THE REPORT OF THE WARNOCK COMMITTEE ON HUMAN FER-
TILIZATION AND EMBRYOLOGY (1984).
111. Fletcher, supra note 29, at 780.
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so that science does not leap ahead of the law, leaving a
wealth of legal and ethical dilemmas behind. If policy makers
act now to regulate IVF, they will not confront, as one
ethicist fears, "a reproductive biologist in need of funds and
reputation . . . in search of an animal species whose gestation
is close enough to the human for it to be not impossible to
use its females as hosts for human embryos. After all, 'herds'
of prime cattle in embryo have been flown across the Atlantic
within rabbits thereafter to be transferred to scrub cows to
bear them. 11 It has become the urgent responsibility of the
law to examine and to regulate clinical and experimental uses
of in vitro fertilization.
112. P. Ramsey, supra note 27, at 18.
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APPENDIX: Proposed Guidelines for the Practice of in Vitro
Fertilization
The Licensing Body and its Functions
A new statutory licensing authority should be established
to regulate both research and those infertility services which
the committee has recommended should be subject to
control.
There should be substantial lay representation on the
statutory authority to regulate research and infertility ser-
vices and the chairman must be a lay person.
The technique of embryo donation by lavage should not
be used at the present time.
The use of frozen eggs in therapeutic procedures should
not be undertaken until research has shown that no unac-
ceptable risk is involved. This will be a matter for review by
the licensing body.
The clinical use of frozen embryos may continue to be
developed under review by the licensing body.
No live human embryo derived from in-vitro fertilisa-
tion, whether frozen or unfrozen, may be kept alive, if not
transferred to a woman beyond fourteen days after fertilisa-
tion, nor may it be used as a research subject beyond four-
teen days after fertilisation. This fourteen-day period does
not include any time during which the embryo may have
been frozen.
Consent should be obtained as to the method of use or
disposal of spare embryos.
As a matter of good practice no research should be car-
ried out on a spare embryo without the informed consent of
the couple from whom the embryo was generated, whenever
this is possible.
Where trans-species fertilisation is used as part of a
recognised programme for alleviating infertility or in the as-
sessment or diagnosis of subfertility, it should be subject to
license and a condition of granting such a license should be
that the development of any resultant hybrid should be ter-
minated at the two-cell stage.
The licensing body be asked to consider the need for fol-
low-up studies of children born as a result of the new tech-
niques, including consideration of the need for a centrally
maintained register of such births.
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Legal Limits on Research
The embryo of the human species should be afforded
some protection in law.
Any unauthorised use of an in-vitro embryo would in it-
self constitute a criminal offence.
Any unlicensed use of trans-species fertilisation involving
human gametes should be a criminal offence.
The placing of a human embryo in the uterus of another
species for gestation should be a criminal offence.
The proposed licensing body should promulgate guid-
ance on what types of research, apart from those precluded
by law, would be unlikely to be considered ethically accept-
able in any circumstances and therefore would not be
licensed.*
The Warnock Commission did not prohibit the freezing
of embryos, but suggested that embryos be "stored" for a
maximum of ten years. This country is advised to adopt a
more stringent provision concerning the freezing of embryos:
Human zygotes and embryos must not be frozen for
prolonged periods and only for purposes of synchronizing
implantation with the host's ovulatory cycle. If diseases
causing infertility will affect the gametes of an individual at
some future time, extraction and freezing of presently
healthy gametes is permissible for use in later fertilization
and implantation.
The Commission was moderate in its regulation of sales
and purchases of gametes and embryos, allowing these trans-
fers under license and conditions prescribed by licensing
body. The U.S. is advised to prohibit all commercial traffic in
human tissue.
The Commission failed to acceptably regulate research
on embryos and permits research on any embryo resulting
from IVF, whatever its provenance, up to the end of the
fourteenth day after fertilization. This country is advised to
adopt the following provision:
Human zygotes and embryos must not be wantonly cre-
ated and destroyed, and the ratio of fertilized to destroyed
IVF embryos must not exceed the waste ratio that occurs
* These guidelines are taken, verbatim, from those of the Warnock
Committee on the Human Fertilization and Embryology. See, The Report
of the Warnock Committee on the Human Fertilization and Embryology
(1984).
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normally in the course of natural human reproduction.
IVF and culture of embryos not intended for transfer is
prohibited.
The reasonable number of embryos that are "wasted"
in IVF and transfer procedures may be used for research,
but research must cease and embryos must be discarded at
the age of fourteen days.
The Commission was sympathetic to the use of donor ga-
metes in IVF, but this country would be wise to follow the
following provision concerning use of IVF:
IVF is available only to married persons or individuals
in a "stable" relationship.
Gametes used in the procedure must be those of the
parties to the marriage or relationship.
Healthy embryos that are not used by donors of the ga-
metes and would otherwise be "wasted" may be adopted by
an infertile host couple and implanted in the womb of the
adoptive host.
The following additional constraints on IVF are sug-
gested for adoption in this country:
Appropriate preliminary research on non-human pri-
mates must establish the safety of a given in vitro procedure.
The state of the IVF art must be such that it involves
no greater risk for the conceptus and mother than in nor-
mal pregnancy and childbirth.
The IVF practitioner must obtain the informed con-
sent of all participants.
Appropriate liability and compensation for research-re-
lated injury must be provided.
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